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Behaviorist Foundations of the Field of Close Relationships 
Since the early-to-mid-1980’s, the subject area of interpersonal relations has 
undergone a remarkable shift in emphasis within social psychology, from a primary 
focus on attraction (Berscheid, 1985), to a joint focus on attraction and close 
relationships (Berscheid & Reis, 1998), to a primary focus on close relationships (M. 
S. Clark & Lemay, 2010).  This shift in emphasis within social psychology has 
coincided with the emergence of a clearly identifiable science of close relationships, 
which M. S. Clark and Lemay (2010) defined as ongoing human interactions that, 
over time, serve the functions of “(1) providing both members a sense of security that 
their welfare has been, and will continue to be protected and enhanced by their 
[partners’] responsiveness; and (2) providing both members a sense that they, 
themselves, have been, are, and will continue to be responsive to their partners” (p. 
899).  Relationship scientists have likened the evolution of their multidisciplinary 
field to progress through various developmental stages of plants, from “greening” 
(Berscheid, 1999), to “ripening” (Reis, 2007), to “blossoming” (L. Campbell & 
Simpson, 2013). 
One of the most highly regarded theories that paved the way for such 
conceptual and empirical progress in the field of relationship science since the early-
to-mid- 1980s is John Thibaut and Harold Kelley’s (1959; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978) 
interdependence theory, which contends that partners in close relationships exert 
mutual influence upon each other’s thoughts, feelings and behavior (Berscheid, 1985).  
Thibaut and Kelley originally proposed interdependence theory to understand 
behavioral dynamics within a variety of small groups (Berscheid & Reis, 1998).  
However, interdependence theory has proven to be especially useful for 
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understanding behavioral dynamics within those small groups that are characterized 
by close relationships (e.g., friends, romantic couples, families; M. S. Clark & Lemay, 
2010).  
 Throughout the present book, I shall draw upon Thibaut and Kelley’s (1959; 
Kelley & Thibaut, 1978) interdependence theory as an important part of the 
conceptual and empirical foundation for a science of close relationships.  In addition, 
I shall note the ways in which Kelley and colleagues (e.g., Kelley, 1979; Kelley, 
Berscheid, Christensen, Harvey, Huston, Levinger, E. McClintock, Peplau, & 
Peterson, 1983/2002; Kelley, J. G. Holmes, Kerr, Reis, Rusbult, & van Lange, 2003) 
increasingly have acknowledged the extent to which each individual’s behavior not 
only is a consequence and a cause of his or her partner’s behavior but also is a 
consequence (and, possibly, a cause) of the individual’s personality (i.e., a variety of 
within-person characteristics that lie outside the domain of individuals’ presumed 
cognitive abilities or intelligence; Digman, 1990).  By the same token, I shall argue 
that interdependence theory is necessary -- but not sufficient -- for relationship 
scientists to understand why individuals behave in a particular manner within close 
relationships (see also M. S. Clark & Lemay, 2010). 
FUINDAMENTALS OF INTERDEPENDENCE THEORY 
Origins of Thibaut and Kelley’s Interdependence Theory:  Lewin’s Field Theory       
 As Kelley and Thibaut (1978) pointed out, their interdependence theory 
(Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) originated as an elaboration of Kurt Lewin’s (1936, 1948) 
field theory.  According to field theory, individuals’ behavior can be understood as a 
joint function of factors within persons (i.e., personality and intelligence) and factors 
outside persons (i.e., aspects of the physical and social environment).  In turn, 
according to interdependence theory, relationship pairs’ or dyads’ pattern of 
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interaction can be understood as a joint function of factors within each of the partners 
and the social situation within which the partners find themselves (Rusbult & van 
Lange, 2003).   
Both field theory (Lewin, 1936, 1948) and interdependence theory (Kelley & 
Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) acknowledge the importance of personality in 
directing each individual’s behavior (J. G. Holmes, 2002).  However, unlike field 
theory (which has been embraced by personality psychologists and social 
psychologists alike; see C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1970; Schellenberg, 1978), 
interdependence theory has been embraced primarily by social psychologists 
(Berscheid, 1985; Berscheid & Reis, 1998).  Even those social psychologists who 
have championed the study of personality have tended to cite field theory, rather than 
interdependence theory, as a major source of conceptual inspiration (e.g., Funder & 
Fast, 2010; Snyder & Cantor, 1998; Snyder & Ickes, 1985).    
 Given that interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & 
Kelley, 1959) is a direct conceptual descendant of field theory (Lewin, 1936, 1948), 
why did field theory (but not interdependence theory) succeed in capturing the 
imagination of many personality psychologists?  McAdams (1997) noted that Lewin’s 
conceptualization of needs not only is central to field theory but also is reflected in 
certain neo-behaviorist personality theories, such as Rotter’s (1954) version of social 
learning theory (which, in turn, gave rise to the personality construct of locus of 
control; Rotter, 1966).  In contrast, although motives or psychological needs can be 
readily incorporated into interdependence theory (van Lange & Balliet, 2015), 
motives (or, for that matter, other major personality constructs) are not as central to 
interdependence theory as needs are to field theory (see Rusbult & Arriaga, 2000). 
Interdependence Theory as a Neo-Behaviorist Social-Psychological Theory 
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 Throughout his career, Kelley made great efforts to distinguish 
interdependence theory from (other) behaviorist theories.  For example, Kelley and 
Thibaut (1978, p. 321) criticized Chadwick-Jones (1976) for aligning their 
interdependence theory (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) with Hull’s (1943) version of 
stimulus-response theory.  In addition, Kelley (1979, p. 31) criticized anyone in 
general (but no one in particular) who might describe interdependence theory as an 
exchange theory (presumably, albeit not explicitly, in the tradition of Homans’s 
[1961] social exchange theory).  Nevertheless, Kelley’s (1979) own definition of 
interdependence specifically invokes Sears’s (1951) version of stimulus-response 
theory: 
Interdependence refers to the effects [that] interacting persons have on 
each other.  Interdependence can be described in many different ways 
depending on the nature of the effect in question.  Thus we might define 
interdependence as mutual attitudinal influence, spread of emotional states 
(contagion), or, as suggested by Robert Sears (1951), mutual behavioral 
effects, [with] each person’s behavior providing the stimulus for the other’s 
response.  (p. 13, emphasis in original)    
 Like other neo-behavorist theories, interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 
1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) addresses the role of rewards (i.e., “the positive 
consequences of interaction”; Rusbult & Arriaga, 2000, p. 81) versus costs (i.e., “the 
negative consequences of interaction”; Rusbult & Arriaga, 2000, p. 81) during the 
establishment, maintenance, and (potential) termination of close relationships 
(Berscheid, 1985).  However, unlike other behaviorist theories, interdependence 
theory suggests that many interpersonal situations exist in which individuals 
understandably refrain from reciprocating partners’ rewarding versus costly behavior, 
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out of concern that such reciprocation could cause irreparable damage to their 
relationships (e.g., reciprocating partners’ heated anger or criticism; see Agnew & 
VanderDrift, 2015).  Thus, although it might not be accurate to refer indiscriminately 
to interdependence theory as one of the “exchange and equity theories” (e.g., Brown, 
1986), interdependence theory does share certain important concepts with other neo-
behaviorist social-psychological theories.    
A Case in Point:  Rewards and Costs as Reflected in Relationship Commitment 
 Perhaps the clearest example regarding the importance of rewards and costs to 
interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) is Caryl 
Rusbult’s (e.g., Rusbult & Buunk, 1993; Rusbult, Drigotas, & Verette, 1994) 
conceptualization of rewards and costs as direct or indirect antecedents of relationship 
commitment, or individuals’ conscious decision to remain in a given relationship over 
the long term (a key construct within interdependence theory; Kelley et al., 
1983/2002, 2003).  Rusbult (1980, 1983; Rusbult, D. J. Johnson, & Morrow, 1986a) 
hypothesized that partners’ rewarding behavior toward individuals would be 
significant positive predictors of individuals’ commitment.  Conversely, Rusbult 
hypothesized that partners’ costly behavior toward individuals would be significant 
negative predictors of individuals’ commitment.   
Consistent with predictions, across several studies, Rusbult (1980, Studies 1 
and 2; Rusbult, 1983; Rusbult, D. J. Johnson, & Morrow, 1986a) found that rewards 
from partners were significant and positive predictors of individuals’ commitment.  
However, contrary to predictions, Rusbult found that costs from partners were 
unrelated to individuals’ commitment.  Nevertheless, Rusbult found that costs from 
partners were significant and negative predictors of relationship satisfaction, or 
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individuals’ happiness with their relationships (like commitment, a major construct 
within interdependence theory; Kelley et al., 1983/2002, 2003).  
 Despite the importance of rewards and costs to Rusbult’s (1980, 1983; 
Rusbult, D. J. Johnson, & Morrow, 1986a) early studies of satisfaction and 
commitment, Rusbult eventually became known for her investment model, which 
focuses on relationship satisfaction, perceived alternatives to the current relationship, 
and relationship investments as predictors of relationship commitment (for a meta-
analytic review, see Le & Agnew, 2003).  Current research on the investment model 
(which was derived from interdependence theory; Kelly et al., 1983/2002; Kelley et 
al., 2003) tends not to directly address rewards or costs in close relationships.  Indeed, 
Rusbult’s Investment Model Scale (Rusbult, Martz, & Agnew, 1998) specifically 
measures satisfaction, alternatives, investments, and commitment.  Therefore, over 
time, Rusbult and her followers have de-emphasized rewards and costs as explicitly 
measured interdependence constructs. 
 This is not to say that rewards and costs have become irrelevant to Rusbult’s 
(1980) investment model.  As Rusbult and Arriaga (2000) pointed out, relationship 
satisfaction is influenced by comparison level (CL), or “the standard by which people 
evaluate the rewards and costs of a given relationship in terms of what they feel [that] 
they deserve” (Berscheid, 1985, p. 431).  To the extent that individuals’ objective 
experiences of rewards versus costs meet their subjective internal standard or CL, 
individuals will tend to be satisfied with their current relationships.  Conversely, to 
the extent that individuals’ objective experience of rewards versus costs fail to meet 
their CL, individuals will tend to be dissatisfied with those relationships.  
Nevertheless, like objective rewards and costs, individuals’ CL is not measured by 
Rusbult’s Investment Model Scale (Rusbult, Martz, & Agnew, 1998). 
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Another Case in Point:  Benefits and Costs as Reflected in Accommodation(?) 
 Another example regarding the importance of rewards and costs to 
interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) is 
Rusbult’s (e.g., Rusbult & Buunk, 1993; Rusbult, Drigotas, & Verette, 1994) 
conceptualization of rewards and (especially) costs as part and parcel of 
accommodation, or individuals’ conscious decision to respond to partners’ costly 
behavior with their own rewarding behavior (yet another major construct within 
interdependence theory; Kelley et al., 2003).  Unlike commitment or satisfaction, 
accommodation has not been linked empirically – whether directly or indirectly – to 
rewards or costs per se.  Rather, Rusbult and colleagues (Rusbult, Verette, Whitney, 
Slovik, & Lipkus, 1991, Studies 1 through 6) began with the assumption that all 
partners behave badly at times (e.g., express anger and/or criticism toward each other) 
in close relationships and then asked individuals to indicate how often they have 
responded to such costly actions with rewarding, relationship-promoting actions 
versus costly, relationship-threatening actions. 
 In the process of defining accommodation, Rusbult (e.g., Rusbult & Buunk, 
1993; Rusbult, Drigotas, & Verette, 1994) distinguished among four potential 
responses that individuals typically make to relationship partners who have been 
angry or critical:  (1) Exit (a costly and overt response); (2) voice (a rewarding and 
overt response); (3) loyalty (a rewarding and covert response); and (4) neglect (a 
costly and covert response).  Rusbult and colleagues (1991) contended that, to the 
extent that individuals refrain from engaging in exit and neglect responses, instead 
engaging in voice and loyalty responses, individuals display accommodation toward 
their partners.  Indeed, across several studies, Rusbult et al. (1991, Studies 1 through 
6) found that relationship commitment was a significant, positive predictor of 
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accommodation as operationalized by high voice, high loyalty, low exit, and low 
neglect. 
 Given that partners’ anger or criticism toward individuals is assumed (rather 
than measured) in Rusbult’s (e.g., Rusbult et al., 1991, Studies 1 through 6) research 
on accommodation, individuals’ transformation of motivation (i.e., “the shift in the 
way [that] a person understands and interprets the situation”; Arriaga, 2013, p. 46) 
during accommodative dilemmas must be inferred.  Rather than behave in accordance 
with the norm of reciprocity (which states that individuals are motivated to respond in 
kind to other persons’ rewarding versus costly behaviors; Gouldner, 1961), 
individuals who face accommodative dilemmas may decide to put their short-term 
self-interest aside for the long-term sake of their close relationships (Berscheid & 
Reis, 1998). 
INTERDEPENDENCE THEORY AND BEYOND:   
PERSONALITY VARIABLES AS REFLECTED IN 
CLOSE RELATIONSHIP PROCESSES 
Accommodation as a Consequence of Individual Differences:  A Role for Personality 
Variables within Interdependence Theory 
 So far, we have considered accommodation (Rusbult et al., 1991) solely as a 
consequence of one social-psychological variable – namely, individuals’ relationship 
commitment (Rusbult, 1980, 1983).  Such a focus is consistent with Rusbult’s belief 
that all empirical roads within her investment model lead through the interdependence 
construct of commitment (see Le & Agnew, 2003).  However, Rusbult and colleagues  
(Rusbult, Olsen, Davis, & Hannon, 2001) acknowledged that one or more personality 
variables (as well as additional social-psychological variables) may be reflected 
directly in accommodation and other “transformation of motivation” processes. 
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 Citing an article by Kelley (1983) concerning interpersonal dispositions (i.e., 
aspects of personality that are especially likely to influence individuals’ behavior 
toward relationship partners, at least in principle), Rusbult and van Lange (2003) 
identified attachment styles (i.e., secure versus insecure orientations toward actual or 
potential relationship partners in general, presumably arising from the quality of 
individuals’ earliest experiences with caregivers; Bowlby, 1969/1997, 1973/1998, 
1980/1998) as precursors of transformation of motivation processes.  At the time that 
Kelley (1983) was writing about interpersonal dispositions, Hazan and Shaver had not 
published their breakthrough article (1987) on adult attachment styles.  Nevertheless, 
Rusbult and colleagues (Gaines, Reis, Summer, Rusbult, Cox, Wexler, Marelich, & 
Kurland, 1997, Studies 1 through 4) demonstrated that scores on Hazan and Shaver’s 
(1987) original, categorical measure of attachment styles were related significantly to 
accommodation in heterosexual romantic relationships (i.e., individuals who 
possessed a secure attachment style scored significantly higher on voice, and 
significantly lower on exit and neglect, than did individuals who possessed insecure 
attachment styles). 
 Furthermore, citing Kelley (1983), Rusbult and van Lange (2003) identified 
social value orientations (i.e., cooperative versus non-cooperative preferences for 
outcomes in interdependence situations; C. G. McClintock, 1978) as precursors of 
transformation of motivation processes.  Social value orientations have not been 
examined as predictors of accommodation in close relationships.  However, van 
Lange and colleagues (van Lange, Otten, de Bruin, & Joireman, 1997. Studies 1 and 
2) found that individuals who held a cooperative preference scored significantly 
higher on secure attachment style (measured as a continuous variable, adapted from 
Hazan & Shaver, 1987) than did individuals who held non-cooperative preferences – 
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a finding that could pave the way for future research on (secure) attachment style as a 
mediator of the impact of social value orientations on accommodation. 
Two important caveats are worth keeping in mind regarding van Lange et al.’s 
(1997) conceptualization of social value orientations as interpersonal dispositions.  
First, personality psychologists tend to view cultural value orientations (i.e., 
organized sets of beliefs that are communicated by various societal agents to 
individuals; Hofstede, 1980), rather than social value orientations (McClintock, 
1978), as personality constructs (see also Kwan & Herrmann, 2015).  Second, even if 
personality psychologists were to adopt the view that social value orientations qualify 
as personality constructs, attachment theorists in particular (following Bowlby, 
1969/1997, 1973/1998, 1980/1998) probably would argue that social value 
orientations should be considered as outcomes -- rather than predictors -- of 
attachment styles (see Landau & D. Sullivan, 2015).  We will return to the construct 
of social value orientations in Chapter 4. 
Bowlby’s Attachment Theory:  A Personality Theory that Potentially Complements 
Thibaut and Kelley’s Interdependence Theory 
 If Thibaut and Kelley’s (1959; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978) interdependence 
theory is the preeminent behaviorist theory within the field of relationship science 
(Arriaga, 2013), then John Bowlby’s (1969/1997, 1973/1998, 1980/1998) attachment 
theory – which is based on the premise that human beings (among other species) need 
emotional intimacy with other persons, from infancy onward – is the preeminent 
personality theory within this field (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2013).  Hazan and Shaver 
(1994a) advocated an integration of interdependence and attachment perspectives 
within the field of relationship science.  Indeed, results of the aforementioned studies 
by Rusbult and colleagues (Gaines, Reis, et al., 1997) suggest that attachment theory 
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can complement interdependence theory regarding insight into such “transformation 
of motivation” processes as accommodation (see also Gaines, Granrose, Rios, Garcia, 
Page, Farris, & Bledsoe, 1999; Gaines & Henderson, 2002).  
 First, let us consider the given situation, or “the benefits and costs that 
objectively exist, as determined by basic structural characteristics, which reflect a 
person’s preferences without any concerns for the interaction partner” (Arriaga, 2013, 
p. 46), that individuals face when their relationship partners express anger or criticism 
toward them.  Interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 
1959) is silent regarding the issue of master motives (see Rusbult & van Lange, 
2003).  However, attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969/1997, 1973/1998, 1980/1998) 
suggests that all individuals are motivated to seek emotional intimacy with other 
persons, even when other persons behave badly toward them (Hazan & Shaver, 
1994a).  Although a “pure” interdependence analysis might focus primarily on the 
costs that individuals experience when they are on the receiving end of anger or 
criticism from their significant others, a combined interdependence and attachment 
analysis might focus as much upon the benefits that being with their partners might 
offer, as upon the costs that bearing the brunt of partners’ negativity might yield. 
 Next, let us consider the effective situation, or “the benefits and costs that 
direct behavior, which are revised from outcomes in a given situation, and reflect 
preferences based on broader social considerations” (Arriaga, 2013, p. 46).  
Interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) does refer 
broadly to interpersonal dispositions as influences on the “transformation of 
motivation” that causes individuals to shift from the given situation to the effective 
situation (Kelley, 1983) but generally has not offered a systematic basis for 
identifying specific interpersonal dispositions that might influence accommodation 
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(see Rusbult & van Lange, 2003).  In contrast, attachment theory (Bowlby, 
1969/1997, 1973/1998, 1980/1998) indicates that although most (i.e., securely 
attached) individuals find it relatively easy to trust relationship partners (largely due 
to their earliest caregivers’ consistent giving of love and affection), many (i.e., 
insecurely attached) individuals find it relatively difficult to trust relationship partners 
(largely to their earliest caregivers’ inconsistent or non-existent giving of love and 
affection; Hazan & Shaver, 1994a).  Although a “pure” interdependence analysis 
might focus primarily on securely attached individuals’ capacity, alongside insecurely 
attached individuals’ incapacity, for maintaining their relationships (and, thus, 
rewarding partners in spite of partners’ negativity), a combined interdependence and 
attachment analysis might focus as much upon securely attached individuals’ greater 
tendency to appreciate and to respond to partners’ past rewarding behavior, as upon 
securely attached individuals’ greater tendency to avoid responding to partners’ 
present costly behavior. 
Attachment Styles:  Holding their Own against Commitment in Predicting 
Accommodation 
 As noted earlier, Rusbult (e.g., Rusbult et al., 1991, Studies 1 through 6) 
consistently emphasized the social-psychological construct of commitment as a 
predictor of accommodation.  However, several of Rusbult’s own studies (e.g., 
Gaines, Reis, et al., 1997, Studies 1 through 4) indicate that – whether operationalized 
as categorical or continuous variables (Hazan & Shaver, 1987) – the personality 
constructs of secure, anxious-ambivalent, and avoidant attachment styles are 
significantly related to accommodation.  Given the status of commitment as a 
“relationship-specific motive” (Rusbult & van Lange, 2003, p. 368) that presumably 
operates alongside interpersonal dispositions in predicting “transformation of 
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motivation” processes such as accommodation, one might ask whether commitment 
and attachment styles each explain unique variance when they are entered together as 
predictors of accommodation. 
 In one study, Rusbult and colleagues (Wieselquist, Rusbult, Foster, & Agnew, 
1999, Study 2) examined commitment as well as continuous measures of secure, 
anxious-ambivalent, and avoidant attachment styles (Hazan & Shaver, 1987) as 
predictors of accommodation in heterosexual relationships.  The data from the study 
in question previously formed the empirical foundation for Study 4 of the 
aforementioned research by Gaines, Reis, et al. (1997).  Wieselquist et al. (1999) 
found that commitment was a significant, positive predictor; anxious-ambivalent 
attachment style was a significant, negative predictor; and secure attachment style was 
a marginal, positive predictor of accommodation (avoidant attachment style was 
unrelated to accommodation). 
 Based on the results of Rusbult and colleagues (Wieselquist et al., 1999), it 
appears that attachment styles hold their own when they are entered alongside 
commitment as predictors of accommodation.  However, Rusbult and colleagues 
concluded that “self-reported attachment style does not account for substantial 
variance beyond the features of interdependence that [collectively] form the basis for 
the present model” (Wieselquist et al., 1999, p, 942).  This apparent paradox can be 
solved once one realizes that accommodation was the only “transformation of 
motivation” process that Rusbult and colleagues considered among a host of 
dependent variables (i.e., dependence level, commitment, accommodation, partners’ 
perceived partner accommodation, trust, and partners’ trust); attachment styles fared 
better in predicting accommodation than in predicting the other interdependence 
constructs (see Gaines & Agnew, 2003). 
15 
 
Beyond Attachment Theory:  A Broader Perspective on Personality and 
Accommodation in Close Relationships 
 Hazan and Shaver (1994a) made a compelling case for incorporating 
attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969/1997, 1973/1998, 1980/1998) throughout the field 
of relationship science.  Nevertheless, Hazan and Shaver (1994b) also acknowledged 
that – like any scientific theory – attachment theory possesses limitations as well as 
strengths.  For example, attachment theorists’ increasing emphasis on mental 
representations of self and other (i.e., individuals’ positive versus negative internal 
working models of themselves and of relationship partners in general; Bartholomew, 
1990) as consciously experienced relationship schemata (see Berscheid, 1994) has 
inadvertently led to a gap in relationship scientists’ knowledge regarding the role of 
the unconscious in attachment processes (Berscheid, 2010).  This gap in knowledge is 
especially ironic in light of the psychodynamic origins of attachment theory 
(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). 
 Several classic “social-psychological” theories of personality (following C. S. 
Hall & Lindzey, 1970) offer relationship scientists the opportunity to broaden their 
conceptual and methodological horizons beyond attachment theory (Bowlby, 
1969/1997, 1973/1998, 1980/1998) as they explore interpersonal dispositions as 
influences on “transformation of motivation” processes such as accommodation.  
Perhaps the most obvious theoretical candidate for such exploration is Harry Stack 
Sullivan’s (1953) interpersonal theory, which contends that individuals’ personalities 
cannot be properly understood without reference to the social and personal 
relationships within which individuals operate (Gaines, 2007a, b).  Some 
interdependence theorists (e.g., Kelley, 1983) have implicitly drawn upon 
interpersonal theory, whereas some attachment theorists (e.g., Bartholomew, 1990) 
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have explicitly drawn upon interpersonal theory, in identifying those aspects of 
personality that are especially likely to be reflected in close relationship processes.  
Furthermore, if one accepts the premise of interpersonal theorist Jerry Wiggins (1991) 
that the gender-role orientation of positive femininity (i.e., a tendency to behave in a 
manner that benefits other persons, stereotypically associated with women; Bem, 
1974) is equivalent to the interpersonal trait of nurturance (which, in turn, is 
individuals’ self-descriptive manifestation of the human condition that is known as 
communion), then Rusbult et al.’s (1991, Studies 3, 4, and 5) finding that positive 
femininity is a significant, positive predictor of accommodation can be interpreted as 
support for interpersonal theory as a complement to interdependence theory. 
 So far, we have considered personality constructs that were derived from 
specific personality theories.  However, many personality constructs either have been 
developed without regard to theory or, in effect, function as stand-ins for entire 
theories.  For instance, the cultural value construct of individualism versus 
collectivism (Hofstede, 1980) arguably does not qualify as a theory in itself (Gaines, 
1997); yet the constructs of individualism and collectivism clearly have influenced 
cross-cultural research on cultural value orientations and accommodation (whereby 
interpersonal value orientation was a significant positive predictor, and personal value 
orientation was a significant negative predictor, of accommodation; Gaines & 
Ramkissoon, 2008).  Thus, personality influences on “transformation of motivation” 
processes such as accommodation need not be linked to specific personality theories. 
Beyond Accommodation:  Relational Trust as a Consequence of Personality 
Influences 
 Thus far, we have focused on accommodation, to the exclusion of other 
interdependence constructs as consequences of personality constructs.  However, in 
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the aforementioned study of commitment, attachment styles, and accommodation in 
heterosexual romantic relationships by Rusbult and colleagues (Wieselquist et al., 
1999, Study 2), anxious-ambivalent attachment style (Hazan & Shaver, 1987) 
emerged as a significant, positive predictor of relational trust (i.e., “feelings of 
confidence and security in the caring responses of the partner and the strength of the 
relationship”; Rempel, J. G. Holmes, & Zanna, 1985, p. 96), the latter of which is as 
fundamental to interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 
1959) as is commitment or accommodation (Kelley et al., 2003).  Relational trust 
includes three components:  (1) Predictability (i.e., the extent to which individuals 
believe that their partners’ past behavior is indicative of partners’ present and future 
behavior; (2) dependability (i.e., the extent to which individuals believe that they 
understand their partners’ personalities, based on partners’ past and present behavior; 
and (3) faith (i.e., the extent to which individuals believe that their relationships will 
persist, in spite of possible uncertainty and challenges over time).     
Rusbult and van Lange (2003) positioned relational trust (and, for that matter, 
commitment) as a “relationship-specific motive” (p. 368) that functions alongside 
interpersonal dispositions as predictors of “transformation of motivation” processes.  
However, one could argue relational trust itself is a “transformation of motivation” 
process (or, at a minimum, entails “transformation of motivation”; Simpson, 2007) 
that reflects individuals’ willingness to risk rejection, even rejection, by their partners 
(see W. H. Jones, Couch, & Scott, 1997).  In turn, if relational trust is an example of 
individuals’ “transformation of motivation,” then it should come as no surprise that in 
the aforementioned study by Rusbult and colleagues (Wieselquist et al., 1999, Study 
2), at least one attachment style (i.e., anxious-ambivalent) emerged as a significant 
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predictor of relational trust, after perceived partner accommodation was taken into 
account (see Murray & J. G. Holmes, 2009). 
 Consistent with the aforementioned finding (Wieselquist et al., 1999, Study 2) 
that anxious-ambivalent attachment style (Hazan & Shaver, 1987) significantly 
predicted relational trust (Rempel & J. G. Holmes, 1986), Rusbult and colleagues 
(Gaines, Panter, Lyde, Steers, Rusbult, Cox, & Wexler, 1997, Study 2) found that the 
interpersonal traits of dominance (i.e., individuals’ tendency to behave in ways that 
benefit themselves) and nurturance (i.e., individuals’ tendency to behave in ways that 
benefit other persons; Wiggins, Trapnell, & Phillips, 1988) were significant, positive 
predictors of relational trust in heterosexual romantic relationships.  The data in 
question had formed the foundation for Study 1 of Gaines, Panter, et al.’s (1997) 
research on attachment styles and accommodation.  The results regarding dominance 
as a significant predictor of relational trust are especially noteworthy when one 
considers that dominance – which Wiggins (1991) viewed as equivalent to the gender-
role orientation of positive masculinity (i.e., individuals’ tendency to behave in their 
self-interest, stereotypically associated with men; Bem, 1974) – is not consistently 
related to individuals’ behavior in close relationships; see Ickes, 1985; Snyder & 
Ickes, 1985). 
 One caveat regarding the scope of relational trust:  Although Rempel, J. G. 
Holmes, and Zanna (1985) originally emphasized similarities between their construct 
of relational trust and Rotter’s (1967) earlier construct of interpersonal trust, 
Wrightsman (1991) pointed out that interpersonal trust as conceptualized by Rotter is 
individuals’ positive attitude toward human nature in general; whereas relational trust 
as conceptualized by Rempel, J. G. Holmes, and Zanna is individuals’ positive 
attitude toward relationship partners in particular.  Also, relational trust as 
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conceptualized by Rempel, J. G. Holmes, and Zanna clearly involves individuals’ 
formation of attributions regarding partners’ personalities and behavior (J. G. Holmes, 
2004) – a social-cognitive process that is not linked clearly to interpersonal trust as 
conceptualized by Rotter (see also J. G. Holmes, 2002).  Finally, relational trust as 
conceptualized by Rempel, J. G. Holmes, and Zanna fits squarely within the evolving 
view (Kelley, 1997b) that interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut 
& Kelley, 1959) is as much a theory of cognition as it is a theory of behavior (see 
Kelley, 1997a) – a view that might help explain why relationship scientists have 
tended to gravitate away from Rotter’s social-learning construct of generalized trust 
(see Simpson, 2007). 
Beyond “Transformation of Motivation” Processes:  Interdependence Processes in 
General as Manifestations of Individuals’ Personalities(?) 
 Throughout the present chapter, we have examined accommodation (Rusbult 
et al., 1991) as influenced by the personalities of individuals within close 
relationships.  Given that Caryl Rusbult was known first and foremost as a social 
psychologist and not as a personality psychologist (Reis, A. Aron, M. S. Clark, J. G. 
Holmes, & van Lange, 2010), it might seem ironic that several of Rusbult’s published 
empirical papers (e.g., Gaines, Panter, et al., 1997; Gaines, Reis, et al., 1997; Rusbult 
et al., 1991; Wieselquist et al., 1999) directly addressed the impact of personality on 
accommodation and other “transformation of motivation” processes.  Then again, no 
less an authority on personality than attachment theorist Phillip Shaver (2010) cited 
Rusbult’s conceptualization and measurement of accommodation as one of the most 
enduring aspects of Rusbult’s legacy to the field of close relationships. 
 The conceptual rationale and accompanying evidence concerning personality 
influences on individuals’ behavior in close relationships may be stronger for 
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“transformation of motivation” processes such as accommodation (Rusbult et al., 
1991) than is the case for other interdependence processes.  For example, A. Aron and 
E. N. Aron (2010) contended that self-expansion (i.e., the process of including 
significant others in individuals’ self-conceptions; A. Aron & E. N. Aron, 1986) – a 
process that Agnew, van Lange, Rusbult, and Langston (1998) likened to cognitive 
interdependence – might preclude “transformation of motivation” processes under 
certain conditions in close relationships.  Indeed, results of a study by Dalsky, Gohm, 
Noguchi, and Shiomura (2008) indicate that the cultural value of collectivism 
(Yamaguchi, 1994) is a significant, positive predictor of including other in the self (A. 
Aron, E. N. Aron, & Smollan, 1992) across samples in the United States and Japan.  
Nevertheless, compared to personality influences on “transformation of motivation” 
processes such as accommodation, the role of personality in self-expansion has 
received relatively little attention within the literature on close relationships (see 
Gaines & Ketay, 2013). 
 Of course, interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & 
Kelley, 1959) is not the only behaviorist theory that one might employ to investigate 
the effects of personality variables on close relationship processes (M. S. Clark & 
Lemay, 2010).  Nevertheless, the field of relationship science historically has 
neglected the systematic study of personality influences (M. S. Clark & Reis, 1988); 
and interdependence theory is well-positioned to assist relationship scientists in 
identifying those behavioral processes that are particularly likely to reflect the impact 
of personality (Rusbult & van Lange, 2003). 
OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT BOOK 
 The present Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to close relationships, from 
the perspective of the dominant neo-behaviorist theory within the field of relationship 
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science (i.e., interdependence theory; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 
1959).  Following the present chapter, we shall explore the impact of the self in 
general on relationship processes in Chapter 2.  Afterward, we shall consider five 
major personality constructs (i.e., traits, Chapter 3; values, Chapter 4; attitudes, 
Chapter 5; motives, Chapter 6; and emotions, Chapter 7) that might be reflected in 
close relationship processes.  Finally, we shall conclude the present book by critiquing 
our review of the literature and identifying potential directions for future research in 
Chapter 8. 
